Introduction
The Taiwan issue is a significant and ongoing political situation, drawing the attention of the U.S. and China. It originated after World War II when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took control of mainland China, leading the Nationalist Party (KMT) to establish a government in exile on Taiwan. Both sides claim Taiwan as part of China but differ in their political systems. Diplomatic efforts to reunify have been challenging, efforts have seem to worsen due to the Democratic Progress Party (DPP) in Taiwan, led by Tsai Ing-Wen since 2016. The DPP leans towards political independence but avoids explicit declarations, as Beijing insists there is only one China, including Taiwan. Any contrary claims by Taiwan could provoke military intervention as an illegal secession. (Dittmer 1).
In contrast, the U.S. insists that the process be done diplomatically and not through means of force. The U.S. has maintained a policy of strategic ambiguity eschewing a direct defense treaty with Taiwan while making it appear the U.S. would very likely support them if China were to initiate a conflict with them. Alternatively the U.S. has made it appear if Taiwan was to start the conflict they would likely be on their own. (“Are Washington and Beijing on a collision Course over Taiwan?”). Recently however, the U.S. President Joe Biden, has perhaps been less ambiguous on what the U.S. would do in retaliation to a hostile move against Taiwan. This leaves not just the world concerned but even more so the U.S. Defense Department. This paper will address the political concerns of the Secretary of Defense and the gdifferent geopolitical challenges that role would face if there was a conflict between China and Taiwan.
China Relations
The U.S. and China relations have been tense for more than 50 years since the rise of the CCP. These tensions arose from the U.S.’ historical disdain for communism, and China’s steady military ascendancy in the Asia-Pacific region. Over the last twenty years China has greatly expanded its military, economic, and diplomatic engagement across the region. While the U.S. expected this growth, China has been aggressively expanding this influence and pressuring regional governments to accept their terms. The U.S. has always had a policy of engaging Beijing where it can but has made it known that the U.S. is prepared if necessary to defeat threats to U.S. interests. (Green 3-15). Structural realists theorize that the relationship that the two nations have is “destined” for a hegemonic war due to both powers being in a hegemon-rising power relationship where China is the competing rising hegemon. U.S. support for an independent Taiwan is viewed by China as the U.S. attempting to slow their rapid rise. The issue of Taiwan provides the U.S. a means of demonstrating the balance between both deterrence and cooperation in the U.S.-China relations. This state of equilibrium exists only if Taiwanese authorities don’t declare Taiwan as independent. (“Are Washington and Beijing on a Collision Course over Taiwan?”). If Taiwan was to declare independence and a conflict broke out between China and Taiwan, the U.S. would likely respond with a combination of multi-domain joint and allied military forces that it has spent decades strategically prepositioning at multiple forward bases around the theater. Those military forces have advanced capabilities honed by routine training drills designed to prepare the force for such a contingency. (Green 32-33). Based on analysis of the U.S. military it is proven that the U.S. retains the ability in the Asia-Pacific for engagement, deterrence, and warfighting that includes ground, sea, cyber, and air capability with only a few gaps and shortfalls. (Green 116-135). Lastly the Chinese-U.S. nuclear balance is dramatically disproportionate; favoring the U.S. for the foreseeable future. Fortunately the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) presents a balanced approach to U.S. nuclear strategy and policy. The purpose of which is to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. (“Remarks at the High-Level Briefing on U.S. Nuclear Policy at the Tenth Review Conference on the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons - United States Department of State.”)
Taiwan Relations
Taiwan is considered one of the most important political issues in the U.S.-China relations. The U.S. views their relationship with Taiwan as a vital strategic part in containing and balancing China’s rise. The U.S. insists however, on a peaceful solution to the Taiwan issue and opposes any unilateral attempt to change the status quo on the issue, whether that be to China’s or Taiwan’s interests. The U.S. has discouragedTaiwan from claiming independence through the Taiwan Relation Act (TRA), which defines the U.S.’ relations with Taiwan and recognizes the principle of “One China.” That said, the U.S. has still intervened in Taiwan affairs beyond its unofficial relationship through massive arms sales which are viewed as critical to keep China’s military ambitions in check. In addition to arms sales the U.S. has also demonstrated its military commitment to Taiwan through adamant support for international freedom of navigation principles. While the U.S. cannot establish an official alliance with Taiwan, it did establish domestic laws that allow the U.S. to intervene in cross-Strait issues that violate the international laws governing the right of international maritime traffic. (Kwang Kyu 156-163). The U.S. believes that maritime security around Taiwan provides a buffer to China’s aggressive unification policies. Overall, the U.S. doesn’t consider broadened U.S.-Taiwan military relationships as a harm to America’s relationship with China for two main reasons Foremost, the U.S. has continued to supply Taiwan arms which are for defensive purposes. Secondly, the U.S. believes that the measures being taken are to improve Taiwan’s defense capabilities and do not connote a military alliance with the U.S.. (Fang). If Taiwan was to go against U.S. advice and declare themselves as independent it is hard to say what the U.S. response would be due to its policy of ambiguity. There is a consensus that if the U.S. would intervene, its actions would be limited . Most action taken by the U.S. would be diplomatic, mainly in efforts to rally allies and deter Beijing. However, if the U.S. did not limit its ability to intervene up to the extent of military and non nuclear intervention it would certainly be an extremely costly victory for China. (Jude and Gerard)
Regional Relations
The U.S. has and will always continue to play a large role in the Pacific region, especially with regard to East Asia especially the Pacific region. TThis has largely contributed to the U.S. policy in the region is focused onand its concern with maintaining a balance of power in the region to protect American interest. It is made clear that U.S. policy in the region opposes efforts outside international laws and norms to at dominate domination of the region by any power or group. U.S. interest mainly lies in its endeavor to advance its economic interest in the region through involvement in economic development and the expansion of U.S. investments and trade. (Sutter 20-21). To do this the U.S. has a number of allied host countries which give the U.S. permission to build military bases on their land, in return forthey receive payment and protection from the U.S.. This greatly benefits the U.S. by providing allowing it rapidto have a quicker global response times in the event case of contingencies within the regiony. (Lostumbo 18-22). In the event that China and Taiwan escalate tensions it would be of extreme importance to the U.S. to maintain good military relations in the Pacific. This is because of the military importance that the region holds. This importance comes from the The U.S.’ “island chain” strategy has established which U.S. strategists developed to push the